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Excessive spending on public employment  has contributed
significandy  to fiscal  crises  in many  developing  nations. Less
visible,  but  also  important  for development,  is the  impact  of pay
and employment  policies  on government  performance.
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Governments should pay more attention to the  quit and leads others to reduce their work effort
influence of pay and employment policies on  or moonlight.  It also takes a toil on civil service
their ability to provide goods and services  morale and discipline.
efficiently.
A recent study of government policies in
Rapid and sustained expansion of govem-  Sub-Saharan Africa found, for example, wide-
ment employment is common in developing  spread declining levels of real pay, especially at
nations.  Gov' mments often find it politicaly  higher salary grades, and excessive compression
difficult to dismiss public workers, even in the  of the govemment pay structure. These policies
face of rising deficits.  have contributed to growing government ineffi-
ciency.
An increase in public employment without a
commensurate increase in complementary inputs  Government employrient practices need to
can add to labor redundancy. Increases in salary  be reformed not only because growing wage
costs may also crowd out expenditures for  bills are outpacing tax and export revenues, but
mater-als, equipment, construction, infrastruc-  also because effective public administration is so
ture, and other inputs.  important to development. In many countries, a
smaller, better-paid civil service might outper-
Many govemments use public jobs as a  form a larger, more poorly paid work force.
means of lowering urban unemployment.  This  Because government economic and social roles
frequently results in a bottom-heavy structure,  are so large in many countries, better perform-
with employment concentrated in lower salary  ance would mean faster development.
grades, and far too many workers for managers
to use effectively.  This is a background paper for the 1988
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David L.  Lindauer is an Associate  Professor in the Department of Economics,  Wellesley College.In  Ghana,  government  employment  is  estimated  to  have  grown  by  15.0%  pefr
annum  from  1975  to  1982  while  real  per  capita  income  declined  by  4.8%  per
year.  Between  1972  and  1982  the  real  starting  salaries  for  some  professional
grade  Jamaican  civil  servants  are  estimated  to  have  dropped  by  as  much  as  70X.
Irt  Sri  Lanka,  the  ratio  of  salaries  from  the  top  to  the  bottom  of  the
government  pay  structure  fell  from  9.6:1  in  1975  to  4:1  in  1983,  resulting  in
a  pay  structure  far  more compressed  than  in  any  neighboring  country.
These  examples  suggest  that  in  many developing  countries  significant
changes  in  government  pay  and  employment have  been  taking  place.  Such
changes  often  reflect  the  macroeconomic  and  fiscal  crises  experienced
throughout  Africa,  Asia  and  Latin  America.  The  consequences  of  these  changes
on  government  performance  and,  more  generally,  on  prospects  for  economic
growth  and  development,  however,  are  not  well  understo,od.
The  aim  of  this  paper  is  to  offer  scme  systematic  examination  of
government  pay  and  employment  trends  in  developing  nations.  In  Section  I,  the
difficulties  inherent  in  analyzing  government  pay  and  employment  policies  are
considered.  Special  attention  is  given  to  weaknesses  in  public  expenditure
theory  and  to  the  non-market  character  of  government  output.  Section  II
highlights  the  problems  generated  by  inappropriate  goveranent  pay  and
employment  policies.  These  include  fiscal  imbalance,  negative  spillover
2effects  onto  non-government  sectors  and  input  mix  inefficiencies  in  government
production.  Most  attention  is  given  to  the  last  of  these,  that  is,  how
government  performance  as  a  provider  of  goods  and  services  is  affected  by
inappropriate  pay  offers  or  the  pursuit  of  independent  government  employment
objectives.  Section  III  presents  the  available  evidence  on  recent  trends  in
government  pay  and  employment  in  developing  nations.  Movements  in  real
government  pay,  wage  compression,  public  sector  employment  growth  and  the  wage
bill  are  considered.  Section  IV  offers  a  brief  conclusion.
I.  The  Analysis  of  Government  Pay  and  Employment  Policies
Evaluation  of  government  pay  and  employment  policies  has  received  less
attention  in  policy  dialogue  and  in  the  academic,  literature  than  have  other
expenditure  questions.  By  comparison,  the  tradeoffs  between  recurrent  versus
capital  costs,  debt  service  versus  domestic  spending,  defense  versus  civilian
needs,  and  social  sector  versus  infrastructure  development  have  been  more
widely  discussed.  To  the  extent  that  all  government  functions  are  affected  by
the  number,  quality  and  motivation  of  public  servants,  issues  of  government
pay  and  employment are  also  of  importance.
The  evaluation  of  government  pay  and  employment policies,  however,  is
difficult.  As with  other  expenditures  issues,  the  analysis  is  hampered  by  the
lack  of  a  well  defined  theory  of  public  production.  What we do have  from  the
theory  of  public  finance  is  a  guide  to  the  problem  of  pubiic  provision.  A
central  thesis  is  the  notion  of  non-rival  consumption  which  renders  exclusion
3inefficient  and  which  calls  for  budgetary  provisions  for  particular  goods.
But  this  insight  tells  us nothing  about  the  desirability,  if  any,  of  public
production  and,  hence,  of the  need for  public  employment. 1
An alternative  approach  to evaluating  government  pay  and  employment  is
to take  as  given  those  goods  and  services  chosen  for  public  production  and  to
consider  whether  such  production  is  efficient  in  terms  of input  use  and  unit
costs. Such  evaluations,  however,  face  their  own  constraints.  For  one,  since
the  government  is  often  a monopoly  supplier,  there  may  be  no basis  upon  which
to compare  the  efficiency  of its  production.  Second,  the  non-market  character
of  most government  services  precludes  the  use  of  market  tests  of  efficiency.
Government  productivity  data,  based  on input  costs  as a measure  of output,
reflect  this  problem. Third,  the  non-tradeable  character  of  most  government
production  suggests  that  border  prices  are  unavailable  as points  of  reference.
Unlike  the  cases  of,  say,  agricultural  price  distortions,  one  cannot  turn  to
world  prices  as an index  of  excessive  or insufficient  pay  for  government
workers. Even  domestic  private  sector  wages  are  an imperfect  standard. Given
the  magnitude  of government  as  a wage  employer,  private  wages  are  never
independent  of a  government's  own  wage and  employment  decisions.  Furthermore,
the  relative  security  of public  jobs imparts  a compensating  differential
problem  precluding  any  simple  comparison  of public  versus  private  pay.
The  analysis  of appropriate  government  pay  and  employment  policies  is
further  handicapped  by the  multiplicity  of objectives  which  guide  such
policies. Cost  minimization  of iublicly  produced  goods  and  services  competes
with  independent  employment  and  wage  objectives  which  may  serve  political  or
ideological  purposes.  In addition,  while  the  level  and  structure  of  pay  and
employment  influence  government  performance,  management  practices  and
4administrative  policies  also  play  a  critical  role. The link  between  pay  and
employment  and  performance  criteria  can,  therefore,  be obscure. Information
problems  are  also  extreme. Msny  governments  do not  even  know  how  many  workers
are  employed  in  the  public  sector  while  the  profusion  of  non-wage  payments
complicates  the  calculation  of compensation  figures.  Finally,  the  public
sector  is  rarely  one  homogeneous  unit  pursuing  a single  well articulated  pay
and/or  employment  policy. Instead,  treatment  of different  grades  of workers
(skilled  versus  unskilled)  or types  of workers  (civil  servants  versus  state
enterprise  employees)  may  diverge  significantly  requiring  separate  analysis.
The  numerous  I  imitations  and  constraints  on the  analysis  of  government
pay  and  employment  represent  significant  hurdles  to  the  proper  evaluation  of
prevailing  policies.  However,  given  the  degree  of  policy  change  experienced
in  many settings  and  the  coincident  rise  and  concern  over  government
performance,  the  subject  continues  to  warrant  attention.
II.  Causes  and  Consequences  of  Inaoprooriate  Government  Pay  and  Emoloyment
Policy
A.  THREE CATEGORIES  OF PROBLEMS
Three  broad  categories  of  probleims  associated  with  government  pay  and
employment  policy  can  be  identified.  One  can  be  referred  to  as  fiscal
imbalance  and  concerns  the  relationship  between  government  expenditures  and
tax  revenues.  At  issue  are  the  macroeconomic  consequences  of  deficits  or
increases  in  taxes  required  to  finance  government  spending,  in.luding
government  employment  expenditures.  Especially  in  periods  of  budgetary
deficits,  prevailing  government  wage  bills  may be considered  inconsistent  with
5sound  fiscal  management.  Restraint,  if  not  outright  reductions,  in  both
public  pay  and  employment  is  one  of several  options  which  needs  to be
considered  to  resolve  the  fiscal  imbalance.  In some  countries,  concern  over
wage bill  requirements  has  been  voice  the  context  of  stabilization
programs,  most  prominently  in  negotiati  ns  with  the  IHP.
The  second  category  of  government  pay  and  employment  policy  problems
involves  spillover  effects. Discussed  in  both  the  academic  and  policy
literature,  the issue  is frequently  argued  in terms  of  high government  wages
spilling  over  to non-government  employers. 2 If such  public/private  wage
relationships  exist,  both  employment  generation  and  output  growth  in  the
private  sector  will be impaired. Prior  to  the severe  budgetary  crises  of the
1980's,  this  notion  of detrimental  government  "wage  leadership"  motivated  much
of the  explicit  treatment  of government  pay  policy  as an area  in  need  of
reform. 3 Under  depressed  macroeconomic  conditions  governments  are  less  likely
to act  as  "wage  leaders"  than  they  are  to  pursue  public  emoloyment  policies
designed  to "mop-up"  excess  supplies  of urban  labor. In this  context,  the
spillover  effects  of government  employment  would  be on the  resulting  levels  of
un-  and  under-employment  for  particular  types  of labor.
The third  type  of problem  associated  with inappropriate  government  pay
and  employment  policy  involves  the  relationship  between  government  pay  and
employment  determination  and  a  government's  own performance  as  a  producer  of
goods  and  services.  This  particular  dimension  of  the  evaluation  of  government
pay  and  employment  policy  has  received  less  attention  in  both  policy  dialogue
and  the  academic  literature  than  have  thR  categories  already  mentioned. This
is  unfortunate  because  a government's  failure  to effectively  provide  public
6goods  and  services  to  an economy  also  may  have  dire  consequences  on  private
s3ctor  performance.
Increasing  concern,  especially  at the  World  Bank,  over  deteriorating
government  performance  from  the  level  of individual  projects  to that  of
national  public  management,  has  prompted  interest  in the  relationship  between
government  pay  and  employment  policies  and  government  performance.  In keeping
with the  focus  of the  1988  WDR  on government  as a  direct  economic  agent,  the
remainder  of this  paper  primarily  considers  this  relationship.
B.  RESOURCE  MISALLOCATION  IN  GOVERNMENT  PRODUCTION
Throughout  the  developing  world,  governments  are  accused  of gross
inefficiencies  in  prolucing  a broad  range  of goods  and  services. Examples
include  teachers  who  have  no  textbooks  or  chalk  to teach  with,  public  health
workers  with insufficient  supplies  of  vaccines,  and  agricultural  extension
workers  without  fuel  for  their  vehicles. Gross  redundancies  in  civil  service
staffing  are  aiso  frequently  reported. Examples  include  corridors  full  of
seemingly  unproductive  messengers  outside  the  offices  of  overworked  senior
administrators.  In  still  other  settings,  high  vacancy  rates  for  professional
positions,  widespread  absenteeism  of government  workers,  or pursuit  of other
than  official  business  during  working  hours  may  be commonplace.
What  these  examples  share  in  common  is  the  potential  for  an inefficient
mix  of inputs  in the  production  of  government  output.  It  may  be  that  too  much
or  too  little  labor  is  employed  relative  to the  availability  of  non-labor
inputs. Or,  the  combination  of labor  skills  hired  for  a particular  task  may
be  more  costly  than  some  other  mix  of labor  skills  capable  of producing  the
7same  level  of output. While  a  host  of managemnt and  administrative  practices
are  crucial  to efficient  public  production,  along  some  margi..  government  pay
and  employment  policies  are likely  to  be important  in  promoting  appropriate
input  use as  well.
Turning  first  to  the  mix  of labor  and  non-labor  inputs,  especially
under  conditions  of fiscal  contraction,  government  production  may  become
excessively  labor-intensive.  This  will  occur  if  purchases  of goods  and
services  are  disproportionately  sacrificed  relative  to  wage  bill  expenditures.
Tendencies  to  favor  labor  payments  over  non-labor  purchases  can  be
traced  to  a  number  of  constraints.  On the  employment  side,  most  governments
find  it  difficult  to  dismiss  civil  servants. This  is  often  because  of the
desire  to  maintain  an  "uwpoliticized"  public  serwvice.  This  goal  can  lead  to
employment  contracts  which  either  explicitly  or  implicitly  contain  tenure
provisions.  Similarly,  the  firing  of  public  workers  may  be perceived  as
polit-.  'ally  sensitive,  providing  additional  degree2  of job  protection  to
government  workers.  The  resulting  quasi-fixed  status  of nominal  labor
payments  out  of  the  budget  can  be  reflected  in  i.stitutional  arrangements.
For  example,  in  Senegal  a  presidential  order  has  been  required  for  stopping
anO  civil  servant's  pay. Such  conditions  suggest  that  budgetary  cutbacks  may
prompt  reductions  in  non-labor  purchases  before  wage  bill  adjustments  are
made.
Government  employment  policies  may  further  exacerbate  input  mix
inefficiency  if  public  employment  programs  are  initiated  in response  to
growing  national  unemployment.  Any  expansion  in  public  employment,  no  metter
how  well  intentioned,  without  a  commensurate  increase  in  complementary  inputs
will  add  to  labor  redundancy  in  government  production.  In  addition  to
8employment  decisions,  government  pay  policies  may  also  lead  to,  growing  wage
bill  shares  which  distort  the  labor/non-labor  input  mix in  government
production.  Pay  offers  in  excess  of  worker  opportunity  costs  may  "crowd-out"
expenditures  which  would  otherwise  have  gone  to finance  non-Labor  inputs.
A rising  ratio  of  wage to  non-wage  expenditures  may be  a signal  of  a
growing  imbalance  between  labor  and  non-labor  inputs  in  government  production.
However,  care  must be  exercised  in  drawing  such  a conclusion  based  on
expenditure  data  alone. After  all,  relative  increases  in  labor  to non-labor
payments  may  teflect  changes  in  relative  input  prices  or an intended  shift  X.
the  compositiorn  of public  output  towards  more labor-intensive  products  --
e.g.,  a shift  towards  social  sectors  and  away  from  infrastructure  development.
While  no simple  test  of the  appropriate  labor  intensity  of government
production  exists,  sudden  shifts  in the  wage  bills  relative  share  of total
expenditures  may  be a  warning  sigA  of  a  growing  imbalance  in  the  input  mix
employed.
Beyond  the  relationship  between  non-labor  and  labor  inputs  lies  the
problem  of  reaching  appropriate  complementarities  between  labor  skills.  An
imbalance  between  numbers  of  managers  and  numbers  of  workers  (or  between
professionals,  skilled  and  unskilled  labor)  may  prove  as inefficient  a use  of
fiscal  resources  as a lack  of complementary  equipment  or raw  materials. The
choice  of  both  pay  and  employment  policy,  of course,  will influence  the  mix  of
labor  skills  in  public  employment.  In  the  area  of employment  policy,  a
tendency  to  use  government  jobs  as a  means  f  lowering  urban  unemployment  can
result  in  an  employment  structure  which  is  bottom  heavy,  that  is,  with
employment  concentrated  in  the  lowest  salary  grades  to  a  degree  unwarranted  by
government  production  requirements.
9Pay  policiks  which  lead  to  significant  compression  in  the  government
wage structure  may  have  a similar  effect  on the  structure  of government
employment,  but  achieved  through  a  different  mechanism. Wage  compression  is
often  financed  by reducing  the  relative  pay  of more  skilled  and  experienced
personnel  in  order  to minimize  the  decline  in real  earnings  at the  bass  of the
employment  pyramid. If resulting  government  wage  offera  for  skilled  and
managerial  staff  fall  below  non-government  offers,  and  if  unskilled  workers  in
government  are  better  compensated  than  their  private  sector  counterparts,  then
differential  vacancy  and  turnover  rates  will  lead  to  an  inefficient  mix  of
labor  skills.  Manager3,  professionals  and  skilled  workers  will  be  in  short
supply  while  unskilled  posts  will  be filled. Regardless  of  the
appropriateness  of  the  mix  of skills  provided  for  by the  budget,  in  practice,
government  production  will  face  an inefficient  combination  of  employed  labor
inputs.
Beyond  problems  of input  mix lie  other  efficiency  issues  which  warrant
discussion  including  the  relationship  between  pay  and  effort. The  assumption
that  a civil  servant's  individual  performance  is  totally  wage inelastic  is
likely  to be invalid. Similarly,  the  claim  that  job  performance  is  strictly  a
function  of relative  wages  is  also  an exaggerated  claim. Between  these
extremes  lies  a  middle  ground  which  sees  wage  offers  combined  with  training,
civic  pride,  supervisory  practices,  promotion  opportunities  and  other
characteristics  of  the  work  place  all  affecting  worker  productivity.
Government  wages  which  are  competitive  with  wage  offers  in alternative
jobs  are  necessary  for  attracting  qualified  staff. Furthermore,  changes  in
the  real  wages  of  government  workers  are  likely  to influence  the  performance
of staff  engaged  in  government  jobs. Rapid  etosion  in real  wages  can  reduce
10work  effort  as  workers  turn  to  other  activities,  including  increased  leisure,
te,  supplement  declining  real  government  salaries.  Such  activities  might
include  moonlighting,  petty  corruption  and  the  pursuit  of  non-government  work
during  official  government  hours.  Maintaining  staff  morale  under  such
conditions  will  become  a  continuous  problem.  At  an  extreme  level,  government
pay  may  come  to  be  seen  by  many  government  workers  as  a  transfer  payment,  with
workers  showing  up  for  weekly  checks  and  little  else. From  a  fiscal
perspective,  while  real  wage  costs  may  decline,  if  real  services  decline  more
than  proportionally,  the  real  unit  costs  of  government  goods  and  services  will
rise.
A lack  of  job  performance  is  often  a  problem  in  environments  where
workers  receive  employment  guarantees,  but  in  situations  of  rapidly  eroding
take-home  pay,  worker  discipline  may  fall  precipitously.  In  such  cases,  a
smaller,  bettar-paid  civil  service  might  outperform  a larger  government  work
force  characterized  by  nsny  poorly  paid  civil  servants.  Stated  differently,
more  efficient  governmer.  production  might  be  achieved  by  reallocating
dwindling  resources  to  fewer  workers.
While  the  impact  of  pay  on  performance  may  become  especially  severe  when
real  wages decline  sharply,  an  inefficient  use  of  government  resources  can
also  occur  if  government  pay  is  in  excess  of  worker  opportunity  costs.
Governments  may even  hire  the  appropriate  mix  of  labor  skills,  and  of  labor
and  non-labor  inputs  as  dictated  by  production  requirements.  But  if
government  pays  "too  much"  for  these  inputs,  input  use  will  be  inefficient
since  the  same government  goods  and  services  could  be  produced  at  lower  cost. 4
From a  theoretical  standpoint  inefficient  government  production  of
goods  and  services  may be  due  to  govqrnrent  pay  and/or  employment  levels  which
11are  either  "too  high"  or "too  low"  for  either  all  workers  or for  selected
labor  skills. While  empirical  examples  of all  possible  policy  outcomes  can
probably  be identified,  in  the  section  to follow  attention  will be given  to
what  appears  to  be the  common  problem  areas.
III. Recent  Trends
Growing  concern  at the  World  Bank  over  the  relationship  between
government  pay  and  employment  policy  and  government  performance  is  reflected
in  recent  landing  patterns.  According  to  a  review  by  Nunberg  (1987),  prior  to
1981  lending  for  government  pay  and  employment  refoms  was  rare,  but  between
1981  and  1986  forty-four  loans  in  twenty-three  countries  have  been  proposed,
and  a  sizeable  number  approved.  These  loans  reflect  a  common view  that
existing  government  pay  and  employment  policies  are  not  making  the  best  use  of
scarce  public  resources.
While  recent  Bank  lending  activity  suggests  concern  over  this  often
neglected  policy  area,  diagnosis  of  problems  and  policy  remedies  remain  poorly
developed.  In  fact,  much  of  the  lending  for  government  pay  and  employment
policy  reform  involves  further  studies  as  part  of  technical  assistance  or
structural  adjustment  packages.  Academic  researoh  has  also  been  limited. 5
The  available  evidence  on  recent  trends  is  summarized  below. 6 While  we  are  a
long  way  from  being  able  to  formulate  precise  policy  guidelines,  the  evidence
does  provide  a  set  of  warning  signals  of  misdirections  and  growing  imbalances.
12A.  COMPENSATION
Some  cross-country  evidence  on  goverment  compensation  patterns  is
provided  by  Lindauer,  Meesook  and  Suebsaeng  (1987).  Their  focus  is  on  a
number  of  Sub-Saharan  nations,  almost  all  of  which  were  selected  for  study
because  of  growing  concern  over  prevailing  government  pay  and  employment
practices.  After  summarizing  these  findings,  comparisons  with  nations  from
other  regions  of  the  world  will  be  made.
The  basic  findings  on  Sub-Saharan  Africa  emphasize  declining  levels  of
real  pay,  especially  at  higher  salary  grades,  and  excessive  compression  of  the
government  pay  structure.  While  worsening  macroeconomic  conditions  are  the
root  cause  of  these  government  pay  trends,  the  actual  pay  and  employment
policies  implemented  as  part  of  the  adjustment  to  greater  fiscal  constraints
have  often  exacerbated  the  situation.  The following  has  been  observed:
(1) In  many  Sub-Saharan  nations,  basic  starting  salaries  for  government
workers,  especially  for  skilled  and  professional  personnel,  have  declined
in  real  terms  since  the  early  to  the  mid  1970s.  This  decline  has  usually
been  greater  than  the  decline  in  real  GDP  per  capita  suggesting  that
government  workers  have  borne  a  greater  than  average  share  of  the  cost  of
national  structural  adjustment.  (Table  1)
(2) In  many  cases,  especially  in  Ghana,  Nigeria,  Sudan  and  Uganda,  the
decline  in  real  starting  salaries  has  been  precipitous.  In  these  four
nations,  top  officials  and  professionals  witnessed  wage  erosion  on  the
order  of  14%  to  35%  per  annum  between,  roughly,  1975  and  1983.  (Table  1)
13(3) Promotions,  progression  up  salary  scales  and  official  supplements  to
basic  wages,  including  cash  allowances  and  payments-in-kind  (e.g.,
government  provided  housing),  have  shielded  some  officials  from  the  real
wage adjustment  in  government  pay.  However,  it  does  not  appear  that  a
fuller  accounting  of  total  government  compensation  significantly  alters  the
general  picture  presented  by  basic  wage  trends  alone.
(4) Turning  to  lower  wage  government  workers,  they  have  generally  not
experienced  as  rapid  a  decline  in  real  salary.  In  Zambia,  for  example,
government  messenger  salaries  declined  in  real  terms  from  1975  to  1983  by
-1.6%  per  annum  as  compared  to  a  fall  in  real  GDP  per  capita  of  -2.4%  per
annum. (Table  1)
(5) Attempts  to  maintain  a  real  wage  floor  for  unskilled  workers  while
permitting  rapid  erosion  in  salary  levels  for  experienced,  professional  and
administrative  staff  have  lM to  sharp  compression  in  government  internal
wage structures.  (Table  2)
The  consequences  of  the  observed  trends  are  harder  to  document  than  the
trends  themselves.  If  government  workers  received  pay  in  excess  of  their
opportunity  costs  in  the  early  1970's,  real  pay  erosion  could  have  promoted  a
more  efficient  use  of  government  resources.  Furthermore,  some  degree  of  wage
compression  is  consistent  with  the  growing  availability  of  educated  and
trained  manpower  in  the  Sub-Saharan  region.  However,  it  is  the  extent  of  the
real  wage  decline  and  wage  compressicn  which  may  have  contributed  to  growing
14inefficiencies  in  government  production.  If  this  has  occurred,  higher  vacancy
rates,  increased  worker  turnover,  more  absenteeism,  reductions  in  work  effort,
etc.  should  be  evident.  Unfortunately,  such  independent  information  on
government  worker  behavior  has  not  been  systematically  collected.  Instead,  we
must  rely  on  anecdotal  evidence  which  suggests  that  these  respenses  to  wage
movements  have,  in  fact,  taken  place.  Especially  for  skilled  staff  recent  pay
trends  have  redntced  the  attractiveness  of  government  work. 7
At  the  lower  end  of  the  pay  structure,  the  situation  is  usually  the
reverse.  With  few  exceptions  (e.g.,  Sudan),  unskilled  government  worker  real
pay  has  been  relatively  protected.  The  fact  that  there  remain  sizeable  queues
for  such  government  jobs  reflects  their  attractiveness.  Private  sector  wage
opportunities  and  returns  to  informal  sector  activities  often  are  below
government  unskilled  wage  offers.  Many  governments  in  Africa  are,  therefore,
pursuing  policies  which  subsidize  their  most  abundant  labor  input.  Such
practices  are  especially  costly  given  the  frequent  expansion  of  government
employment  at  the  lowest  ranks.  The provision  of  unskilled  government  jobs
with  relatively  rigid  real  wage floors  has  become a  costly  transfer  payment
program  which  undermines  the  government's  ability  to  finance  efficient
production  of  goods  and  services.
Outside  of  the  Sub-Saharan  region  the  problems  resulting  from  pay
erosion  and  wage  compression  are  also  voiced.  (See  Table  3  reproduced  from
Nunberg  (1987).)  However,  even  simple  statistics  on  changes  in  real  starting
salaries  or  on  the  pay  structure  are  rarely  presented.  The  fiv  cases  for
which  information  is  available  include  Bangladesh,  Jamaica,  Sri-Lanka  and
Thailand  (Table  4). The  Bangladesh  and  Jamaica  results  share  much in  common
15with the  extreme  cases  reported  for  Africa. Positions  at the  top  of the
salary  structure  have  witnessed  substantial  erosion  in  a short  space  of time.
In Jamaica,  it is  reported  that  vacancy  rates  for  senior  staff  in  line
agencies  have  approached  50%. By comparison,  Thai and  Sri-Lankan  government
workers  have  relatively  kept  pace  with  the  rest  of the  economy. This is  not
to say  that  existing  government  pay  levels  in  these  nations  are  optimal,  but
rather  that  pay  policy  has  not  radically  changed  in  recent  years. Pay  policy
problems,  tterefore,  may  result  from  more long-term  and  structural
characteristics  of  government  compensation  levels.8
Beyond  pay  erosion  and  wage  compression  lie  other  problems  related  to
compensation  practices.  The  actual  forms  of  compensation,  that  is,  the
significance  of  basic  wages  versus  special  allowances  or  payments  in  kind,  can
generate  additional  inefficiencies.  For  example,  a  profusion  of  allowances
makes monitoring  of  compensation  difficult.  Tnis  appears  to  have  reached
extreme  proportions  in  Peru  where  basic  wages  are  reported  to  account  for  only
35%  of  total  remuneration  for  more  senior  positions.  Indonesia  is reported  to
have  a  similar  problem.  Also  in  Indonesia,  the  system  of  allowances  has
created  incentives  at odds  with  the  efficient  production  of government  goods
and  services.  A telling  example  is  an  allowance  paid  for  meetings  attended.
Independent  of  production  requirements,  both  the  number  of  as  well  as
attendance  at  meetings  is  believed  to  have  risen  as  a  result  of  this  pay
practice.
In  Bolivia,  an  altogether  different  obstacle  to efficient  pay  policies
presents  itself.  Lacking  a  central  civil  service  pay  scale,  individual
ministries  set  their  own  salary  levels.  While,  in  principle,  this  policy
could  encourage  inter-agency  competition  yielding  an efficient  allocatior  of
16labor  within  the  government,  in  practice  the  system  appears  to  encourage  the
worst  elements  of  individual  rent-seeking  and  the  further  separation  of  pay
from  job  performance  criteria.
B.  EMPLOYMENT
Documenting  the  size,  growth  and  structure  of  government  employment
would  appear  to  be  a  relatively  straight-forward  matter.  In  many  developing
economies,  however,  it  is  not. In  some  cases  it  has  even  proven  necessary  to
conduct  a  civi.  service  census  in  order  to  determine  who  is  actually  working
for  the  government.  For  purposes  of  cross-country  comparisons,  available  data
are  limited  because  no  standardized  system  for  collecting  public  employment
statistics  exists.  Neither  the  ILO  nor  any  UN  agency  regularly  requests
estimates  of  public  employment.  What  is  available  are  individual  country
sources  which  ofter.  differ  widely  according  to whether:  (1)  national,  local
and/or  public  enterprise  workers  are  included;  (2)  actual  or  budgeted
positions  are  reported;  and  (3)  casual  or  daily  workers  are  counted.  Needless
to  say,  information  is  even  scarcer  on  how  the  st-ucture  of  government
employment  is  changing,  that  is,  on  the  relative  expansion  of  managerial,
professional,  skilled  and  unskilled  labor.
According  to  the  data  assembled  by  Ozgediz  (1983),  reproduced  as  Table  5,
public  employment  growth  in  developing  nations  in  the  late  1970s,  in  most
cases,  well  exceeded  comparable  employment  growth  in  OECD  countries.
Furthermore,  more  recent  data,  Table  6,  complement  the  earlier  estimates  of
high  rates  of  government  employment  growth.  Tha  data  suggest  that  rapid
expansion  of  government  employment has  beon  maintained  for  many years  in  a
significant  number of  low and  lower-middle  economies.
17Having  established  basic  trends  the  question  remains  how  to  assess
these  developments.  The  fact  that  public  employment  growth  in  developing
nations  exceeds  that  of  advpnced  economies  is  not  surprising  given  the  higher
levels  of  public  employment  per  capita  which  characterize  more  advanced
economies. 9 Furthermore,  as  noted  earlier  in  this  paper,  lacking  a  well
defined  theory  of  public  production,  it  is  difficult  to  establish  optimum
levels  of  government  employment.  But  certainly,  at  least,  the  double  digit
government  employment growth  rates  must  stand  as  warning  signs  of  growing
input  mix  inefficiencies  especially  when these  rates  are  in  excess  of  the
growth  in  total  government  expenditures. 10 It  is  difficult  to  believe  that  in
such  situations  the  capacity  exists  both  to  finance  adequately  and
productively  employ  so  many  new  workers.  In  situations  where  professional  and
managerial  manpower,  and  foreign  exchange  are  scarce  such  rapid  growth  in
public  employment  is  not  likely  to  represent  tne  best  use  of  government
resources.
Further  reasons  to  question  the  appropriateness  of  rapid  expansion  of
government  employment  include  the  motivations  behind  observed  employment
growth.  Often  public  employment  is  enlarged  for  reasons  other  than  the  desire
to  increase  production  of  public  goods  and  services.  The use  of  government
employment  as  political  patronage  is  but  one  example.  Another  is  given
stagnating  agricultural  sectors  and  minimal  opportunities  for  private  wage
employment,  governments  use  public  employment  as  a  tool  to  combat  urban
unemployment.  Such  programs  have  even  been  instititionalizad  as  "employer-of-
last-resort"  policies  whereby  government  guarantees  employmept  for  particular
types  of  school  leavers.11  While  rising  unemployment  is  a  problem  government
must  contend  with,  public  employment  generation  may  not  be  the  most  efficient
18response. This  will  especially  be true  if the  expansion  of government
employment  leads  to  a  ganeral  deterioration  in  government  performance.
Besides  "employer-of-last-resOrt"  policies,  which  generally  seem  to  be
on the  wane,  the  often  rapid  growth  in  casual  or  daily  paid  labor  may  be
motivated  by  employment  objectives  independent  of  government  production
requiroments.  In  Zambia,  for  example,  from  1978  to  1983  the  number  of  daily
paid  workers,  most  of whom  were  unskilled,  grew  at  4.2%  per  annum  compared
with 1.3%  for  all  permanent  civil  servants. 12 During  this  period,  copper
prices  fell  precipitously  and  unemployment  was  a growing  concern. While
offering  a  temporary  solution  to  pressing  employment  needs,  public  employment
expansion  has  also  strained  the  government  budget  and  generally  contributed  to
a  less  than  optimal  allocation  of  scarce  public  resources.
In  other  settings  an  increase  in  government  resources,  often  because  of
favorab'L  exutrnal  tems-of-traude  hias  promuted  public  empLOyment expansion.
This  appears  to  have  contributed  to  employment  growth  in  Bolivia  and  Nigeria.
Such  a  tendency  often  leads  to  employment  redundancies  and  becomes  even  more
problematic  when  terms-of-trade  move  unfavorably  and  the  government  finds  it
difficult  to  shed  public  workers.  This  then  results  in  high  government
employment/low  government  wage  policies  which  may  maintain  jobs  but  at  the
cost  of  reduced  government  performance. 1 3
In  general,  redundancies  in  government  employment  in  many  developing
nations  have  reached  extreme  levels. Ozgediz  (1983)  reports,  "In  Egypt,
according  to  an ILO  estimate,  overstaffing  was close  to 42 percent  of the
total  civil  service  employment  in 1976. A recent  consultant's  study  of the
19headquarters  office  of two  ministries  in  a West  Africa  country  identified
6,000  out  of  a staff  of  6,800  as redundant."1 4 While  there  is  no single,
well-defined  algorithm  for  determining  redundancies,  micro-level
investigations  bear  out  significant  overstaffing  problems. Rapid  growth  in
public  employment  has  greatly  contributed  to this  problem.
The implications  of  widespread  redundancies  on economic  growth  shiould
not  be  minimized. In a recent  and  provocative  paper  by  Gelb,  Knight  and  Sabot
(1986),  the  authors  employ  a simple  CGE  model  to estimate  the impact  of,  what
they  term,  surplus  labor  in  public  employment,  on gi4wth  in  national  output
per  worker. In this  model  zero  marginal  product  workers  no longer  reside  in
the  rural  sector  but instead  are  to be found  in  government  ministries.  The
costliness  to the  economy  of these  workers,  plus  the  capital  in  the  form  of
offices,  vehicles,  etc.  they  are  provided  with,  is  measured  in  terms  of  how
quickly  domestic  savings  are  absorbed  to finance  thne  "public  employment  sink."
While  the  model  is intended  for  heuristid  purposes  only,  it  does  demonstrate
that  national  standards  of living  can  be dramaticallv  effected  when  domestic
savings  are  channeled  to finance  non-productive  government  workers.
C.  WAGE  BILL
It is  movements  in the  government's  wage  bill,  more  so than  direct
concern  over  government  performance,  which  tend  to  call  attention  to
prevailing  government  pay  and  employment  policy.  In  Costa  Rica,  for  example,
government  current  expenditure  as  a  share  of  GDP grew  from  12.6Z  in  1975  to
14.2%  in  1978.  Unmatched  by  revenues,  expenditure  growth  caused  the  budget
deficit  to  grow,  prompting  calls  for  close  examination  of  expenditure
increases  Since  both  wages  and  employment  in  the  government  sector  were
20found  to  have  increased,  government  pay  and  employment  policy  reforms  were
formalized  and  pursued. In  Bolivia  and  Zambia  a  similar  pattern  was  followed.
Growing  budget  deficits  initiated  interest  in  revising  prevailing  goverxment
pay  and  employment  practices. In the  majority  of cases  cited  by Nunberg
(1987),  Table  3,  an  "excessive"  wage  bill  was  diagnosed  as a  major  problem  for
those  nations  with  World  Bank  government  pay  and  employment  interventions.
Many of  these  diagnoses  stemmed  from  audgetary  concerns.
While  movements  in  a government's  wage bill  are  directly  relevant  to
fiscal  management  and,  hence,  macroeconomic  policy  attention  should  also  be
paid  to the  more  micro-efficiency  implications  of  wage  bill  growth. For
example,  is such  growth  being  driven  by increases  in  wages  or employment,  or
both?  If employment  growth  dominates,  is  it  warranted? Furthermore,  are  jobs
being  "financed"  by low  pay  policies  and  if so,  what implication  will this
have  on government  performance?  Since  these  issues  have  already  been
discussed  we turn  to one  other  insight  the  analysis  of the  wage  bill  can
offer,  namely,  the  mix  of labor  and  non-labor  inputs  in  government  production.
Of interest  is  whether  increases  in  the  wage  bill  "crowd-out"  government
purchases  of non-labor  inputs  and  distort  the  input  mix in  government
production.
While  there  exists  widespread  concern  over  worsening  factor  proportions
in  government  production,  there  has  been  little  systematic  analysis  of the
problem  at  an aggregate  level. 15 What  studies  are  available  often  highlight
the  difficulties  in  assessing  factor  proportions  based  on expenditure  ratios
alone. Tre  measures  usually  relied  upon include  the  share  of the  wage  bill
out  of GDP,  government  revenues,  total  government  expenditures,  or  government
recurrent  expenditures.  The ratio  of  wages  and  salaries  to expenditures  on
21materials  and  supplies  can  also  be computed  from  most government  financial
accounts.  Each  of  these  measures  captures  a  diffsrent  aspect  of  the  wage
bill's  claim  on  government  resources.  For  example,  the  share  of  government
wages  in  GDP,  reported  for  many  nations  in  Heller  and  Tait  (1983),  primarily
serves  as  a  proxy  for  the  size  of  government  in  the  economy.  The  other
measures  come  closer  to  assessing  the  wage  bill's  claim  on  resources  relative
to  other  inputs.
When  the  wage  bill  begins  to  claim  incr'asing  amounts  of  expenditures,
or  revenues,  this  may  signal  changing  factor  proportions  in  government
production.  An  extreme  example  is  offered  by  Liberia  where  the  wage  bill  is
estimated  to  have  jumped  from  36%  to  66%  of  revenues  between  1977  and  1981.
Reports  of  widespread  shortages  of  materials  throughout  the  government
followed  these  events.1 6 Shortages  in  complpmwntary  inputs,  however,  may  be
endemic  and  not  the  result  of  sudden  changes  in  the  wage  bill's  claim  on
revenues.  In  the  Central  African  Republic  the  wage  bill/revenue  ratio
actually  fell  from  79%  to  59%  between  1976  and  1984,  suggesting  some  increase
in  input  use  relative  to  labor.  However,  an  independent  study  of  at  least  one
ministry,  the  Ministry  of  Rural  Development,  found  95%  of  its  budget  going  to
wage  expenditures  leaving  a  mere  1570  CFAF  (roughly  $6)  per  person  per  month
to  cover  non-labor  operating  costs.17  Real  factor  proportions  may,  therefore,
be  poorly  indexed  by  a simple  expenditure  ratio  due  both  to  changing  relative
prices  and  questionable  data.
Rwanda  provides  another  example.  From  1979  to  1981  the  ratio  of  wages
and  salaries  to  current  revenues  rose  dramatically  from  34%  to  49%. By
comparison,  the  ratio  of  the  wage  bill  to  current  expenditures  increased  only
3%,  from  51%  to  54%,  suggesting  a  less  drastic  picture  of  changing  factor
22proportions.  The  difficulty  with  the  wage  bill/revenue  ratio  was its
sensitivity  to changing  coffee  prices  and its  failure  to capture  other  sources
of public  finance. 18
It  might  be  argued  that  the  ratio  of  wage  payments  to  material  and
services  purchases  is  the  most direct  expenditure  index  of changing  factor
proportions.  However,  this  measure  also  faiis  to account  for  changing
relative  prices. In  Bolivia,  national  accounts  suggest  a substantial  rise  in
complementary  inputs  as the  wage/purchases  ratio  fell  from  6.2  to  2.5  from
1982  to 1986. According  to  Klinov  (1987),  the  ratio  reflects  the  dominance  of
a  decline  it.  wages  relative  to  material  prices. More  detailed  inspection  of
individual  ministries  reveals  that  the  availability  of complementary  inputs
per  worker  is little  different  that  it  was at the  start  of the  period.1 9
Similarly  in  Ghana,  the  change  in  the  ratio  of the  wage  bill  to  expenditures
on  goods  and  services  has  been  modest.  However,  purchases  of  grods  and
services  in  1983  in  real  term3  equal  less  than  half  of  the  amounts  in  1977,
while  actual  employment  more  than  doubled. 20 Factor  proportions  have  worsened
but  available  expenditure  ratios  often  fail  to capture  these  changes.
In sum,  we do not  have  any  benchmarks  for  when the  ratio  of  government
wages  to  GDP,  government  expenditures,  revenues,  or  non-labor  purchases
becomes  "excessive".  In fact,  because  of  changing  relative  prices  --  rising
material  costs  avd  falling  real  wages  --  available  ratios  may  not  capture  the
drift  toward  deteriorating  factor  proportions  in  government  production.  What
seems  to  be called  for is  greater  attention  to  how  government  pay  and
employment  policies  influence  both  the  purchase  of real  inputs  and  the  real
labor  time  productively  employing  these  inputs.
23IV.  Conclusion
In  response  to  mounting  fiscal  pressures  recent  trends  in  government
pay  and  employment  policies,  especially  in  the  Sub-Saharan  region,  suggest  the
following.  Governments  frequently  have  favored  the  expansion  of  public
employment  over  maintaining  real  compensation  levels;  non-labor  inputs  have
been  sacrificed  relative  to  wage  bill  expenditures;  and  the  real  earnings  of
higher  paid  staff  have  been  permitted  to  erode  more  quickly  than  those  of  more
unskilled  workers.  Taken  together  these  tendencies  have  probably  contributed
to  significant  shifts  in  the  input-mix  available  for  government  production  and
in  so-doing  may  have  also  contributed  to  a  deterioration  in  the  efficiency  of
public  production.  These  findings  suggest  that  while  macroeconomic  events  can
exert  considerable  pressure  for  pay  and  employment  reforms,  the  microeconomic
consequences  of  such  policies  should  not  be  ignored.
24NOTES
1  This  point  is  well  articulated  in  Musgrave  (1982).
2.  The  following  quotations  from  two  separate  World  Bank  reports  on Sub-
Saharan  Africa  voice  concern  over  high  government  wages  spilling  over  to
the  private  sector:
African  wages  are  high compared  with those  of Azia...Higher  African
wages  reflect  both  government  wage  policv,  which  in  many countries
sets industrial  wages  above  the level  they  would  otherwise  be,  and
better  opportunities  for  agricultural  employment.  World  Bank (1981)
Personnel  policies  in  the  public  sector  must  also  change:  they
influence  urban  earnings  because  the  government  and  public  enterprises
are  the  largest  employers  in  most  countries. Public  sector  hiring  and
wage  policies  have inflated  wages  and in  many cases  left  them  out  of
line  with  productivity  and  labor  costs  in  other  developing
countries....  World  Bank  (1986)
3. An analytical  framework  for  evaluating  the  impact  of  government  pay  and
employment  decisions  on the  private  sector  is  presented  in  Lindauer
(1987a).
4. There  are,  of course,  other  types  of inefficient  resource  allocation
related  to  government  production.  These  would  include  the  overall  mix  of
public  versus  private  goods  as well  as the  composition  of public  goods.
However,  neither  of these  allocative  issues  seems  to directly  depend  on a
government's  choice  of  pay and  employment  policy.
5.  Cross-country  evidence  on government  pay  and  employment  policy  is
presented  in  Harris,  Andoh,  Evlo  and  Starr  (1987),  Heller  and  Tait
(1983),  Lindauer,  Meesook  and  Suebsaeng  (1987)  and  Ozgediz  (1983).
Detailed  country  studies  are  available  for  Bolivia  (Klinov  (1987),
Senegal  (Bloch  (1985)),  Sudan  (Lindauer  and  Meesook  (1984)),  Thailand
(Bloch,  Chutikul  and  Poapongsakorn  (1986))  and  Zambia  (Meesook,  Lindauer
and  Suebsaeng  (1986)). A bibliography  of academic  writing  on government
pay  policy  can  be found  in  Lindauer  (1987a). A useful  collection  of
articles  on government  employment  with  special  reference  to developed
economies  is  Haveman  (1982).
6.  The remAinder  of this  paper  strictly  focuses  on  government  as distinct
from  public  enterprises.  Pay  and  employment  policy  with  regard  to state
enterprises  is  considered  in  Lindauer  (1986).
7. One indication  of the  changing  attraction  of government  work is  provided
by the  observation,  at least  in  Africa,  that in  contrast  to the  situation
in  the  1960's  and  1970's,  private  pay  now  swamps  government  wage  offers
for  professional  and  skilled  labor.
258. In Sri  Lanka  the  observation  has  been  made that  the  goverrment  pay
structure  is  significantly  "out-of-line"  with  neighboring  countries.  A
recent  report,  "A  Policy  Framework  on Cadres  and  Salaries",  by the
Administrative  Reforms  Committee,  presented  the  following  data. The
ratio  of top  to  bottom  salaries  in  six  Asian  nations  was:  Singapore,
62:1;  Malaysia,  25.4:1;  Pakistan,  19.4:1;  India  and  Bangladesh,  12:1;
and,  Sri  Lanka,  7.5:1. But,  as suggested  by  Table  4 in the  text,
compression  in  the  Sri  Lankan  pay  structure  may  be due  more  to long  term
factors  than  short-term  real  wage  movements.
9.  Heller  and  Tsit  (1983)  reveal  that  even  with  the  rapid  growth  of
government  employment  in  many  developing  economies,  government  employment
per  capita  remains  far  higher  in  advanced  economies.  This  may, in  part,
reflect  the  further  development  of the  welfare  state  in  rich  versus  poor
nations. However,  with  regard  to  the  development  of domestic  labor
markets,  public  employment  in  developing  versus  developed  nations
represents  a far  higher  percentage  of total  wage  employment.  This  helps
to  explain  greater  concern  in  developing  country  settings  over  government
pay  and  employment  policy  spill-over  effects.
10.  Lindauer  (1987b)  presents  cross-country  evidence  on recent  growth  in
government  expenditures.
11.  Egypt  is  frequently  cited  as a  nation  heavily  committed  to "employer-of-
last-resort"  policies. Ozgediz  (1983)  indicates  that  Cote-d'Ivoire,  Mali,
Mauritius  and  Sri  Lanka  have  also  pursued  such  policies  in the  recent  past
(p.6). Harris,  Andoh,  Evlo  and  Starr  (1987)  comment  that  Senegal,  Togo,
CAR,  Guinea,  Mali  and  Sudan,  "...got  into  difficulty  in  the  1980s  by
having  policies  of automatic  hiring  of all  university  graduates  as output
of the  educational  system  began  to expand  rapidly." (pp.  97-98)
12.  Lindauer,  Meesook  and  Suebsaeng  (1987),  p. 19.
13.  Klinov  (1987)  discusses  this  issue  for  Bolivia. She  summarizes,
Low-wage-high-employment  rather  than  high-wage-low-employment  is  a
preferred  combination  by  workers,  because  of a conjunction  of a small
probability  of regular  salaried  employment  in  the  private  sector,  and
the  acceptability  of moonlighting  while  working  in the  public  sector.
The insurance  value  of a  public-sector  job is  underlined  by the
central  role  of health  insurance  in  workers'  compensation:  all  public-
sector  employees  are insured,  as against  a very  small  percent  in
private-sector  employment.  When  economic  conditions  in the  private
sector  deteriorate,  as they  did in  the  eighties,  the  pressure  for  this
combination  increases.  (p.5)
14.  Ozgediz  (1983),  pp.  6-7.
2615.  Harris,  Andoh,  Evlo  and  Starr  (1987)  offer  a  multi-country  study  of  wage
bill  containment  in  the  Sub-Saharan  region. This  study  presents  wage
bill  ratios,  over  time,  for  roughly  a dozen  countries.  Although  the
authors  do not  provide  any  direct  cross-country  comparisons,  one  can
contrast  individual  nations. What  results  is a  tremendous  variance  in
the  wage  bill  ratios. Wage  bill  shares  out  of  government  expenditures  in
the  mid 1980s  range  from  18-63%;  relative  to revenues,  11-592;  and,
relative  to  material  purchases;  0.37  to 4.33. More  disturbing  is  that
the  variance  in  these  ratios  seems  to bear  little  resemblance  to  whether
or  not  complementary  inputs  are  reported  to  be  a  problem  or,  more
generally,  to  the  authors'  valuation  of  government  performance.
16.  Khan  (1983),  p. 1 1.
17.  Harris  et  al. (1987),  pp.  34-40.
18.  ibid.,  pp.  29-33.
19. Klinov  (1987),  pp. 11-13.
20.  Harris  et al.  (1987),  pp.  81-87.
27Table  ls  Trends  in  Real  Basic  Starting  Salaries  ia  the  Public
Sector  in  Selected  African  Countries
Annual  Rate  of Growth  (2)
Country/Level  Period  Salary  Real  GDP/Capita
Ghana  1977-1983  - 4.8
2  Principal  Secretary/Director  -30.8
5  Office/Administrative  III/  -26.9
Senior  Works  Superintendent
10 Messenger/Watchman/Laborer  -14.3
Malawi  1975-1983  1.2
S5  Undersecretary  - 5.3
A3 University  Graduate  - 3.7
D 6 Messenger  - 2.0
Niaeria  1975-1983  - 2.1
17  Permanent  Secretary  -13.9
8  University  Graduate  -11.4
1  Unskilled  Laborer  - 5.5
Senegal  1976-1984  - 2.6
A  With  university  degree  - 3.7
B  With secondary  school  diploma  - 2.1
E  No diploma  1.5
Sierra  Leone  1975-1980  0.2
Deputy  Secretary  - 9.1
Technical  Officer  - 6.8
Messenger  0.7
Sudan  1975-1983  -5.2a
4  Deputy  Undersecretary  -14.4
9  University  Graduate  -13.5
14  Secondary  School  Graduate  -13.3
18 Unskilled  Worker  -12.3
Utanda  1976-1983  -3.2
Ul  Permanent  Secretary/Under  -34.8
Secretary
US  Entering  University  Graduate  -33.3
Group  Employee  -23.5
Zambia  1975-1983  -2.4
S3 Undersecretary  - 9.5
S12  Entering  University  Graduate  -10.6
S21  Lowest  Salaried  Employee  - 2.3
Laborer  - 1.6
a.  1975-1982.
Source:  Lindauer,  Meesook  and  Suebsaeng  (1987);  Table  3Table  2: Salary  Compressiona  in  Selected  African  Countries,  1970-1983
Total  Percentage
















salaried  employee  19.2c  14.5  10.3  6.9  -52.4%
a.  Salary  compression  is  measured  as  the  ratio  of basic  starting  salaried  of
the  highest  to the  lowest  skill  categories  for  which  data  are  available.
b.  1972
c.  1971
Source: Lindauer,  Meesook  and  Suebsaeng  (1987);  Table  5.
29Table  3:  Major  Diagnosed  Problems  For  Countries
With  Bank  Employmnt/Pay  Inter  entions
Excessive  Surplus
Wage  Civil  Salary  Salary
Bill  Servants  Erosion  Comoression
Bangladesh  Bangladesh  Bangladesh  Bangladesh
Bolivia  Bolivia  Bolivia  Bolivia
CAR  CAR  Jamaica  Guyana
Costa  Rica  Costa  Rica  Mali  Jamaica
Gambia  Gambia  Peru  Peru








Sierra  Leone  Senegal
Togo  Sierra  Leone




Source: Nunberg  (1987),  Table  5.
30Table  4: Trends  in  Real  Basic  Starting  Salaries  in
the  Public  Sector,  Selected  Countries
Country/Level  Annual  Rate  of  Growth  (%)
________________  Period  Salary  Real  GDP  Canita
Bantladesh  1970-83
Senior  Civil  Servants  -16.2%  1.3
Jamaica  1972-82
Top of  Scale  -8.8%  to  -11.3%  -3.0
Bottom  of  Scale  - 2.7%
Sri  Lanka  1975-83
Administrative  Post  - 3.6%  3.6
(Class  I;  Grade  II)
Unskilled  4.8%
Thailand  1976-84  3.8
Grade  9  - Deputy  - 1.5%
Director  General
Grade  1 - Secondary  - 2.3%
Education  Required
So'trces:  Banuladesh:  World Bank Report  No.  4822,  Bangladesh:  Economic Trends
and  Development  Administration,  Feb.  27,  1984;  p.  111.  Jamaica:  World  Bank
Report  No.  P-3796-JM,  Public  Administration  Reform  Proiect,  May  3,  1984,  pp.
9-10. Sri  Lanka:  Research  notes,  B.  Nunberg  (1987),  World  Bank,  Table  4.
Thailand:  World  Bank  Background  Paper,  P.  Bloch,  S.  Chutikul  and N.
Poapengsakon,  "Public  Sector  Employment in  Thailand",  p.  58.
31Table  5: Growth  in  Public  Employment
Avera&a  annual
growth  rate
Country  Period  (%)
Developing  countries
Zaire  1976-78
Mexico  1970-79  13.1
Burundi  1976-80  12.5
Nigeria  1970-76  11.1
Ecuador  1970-76  10.1
Honduras  1977-81  10.1
Cameroon  1976-81  9.1
Egypt  1977-79  7.7b
Portugal  1976-80  7.7b
Mauritius  1974-80  7.5
Malawi  1971-76  7. 5b
Thailand  1967-77  7.3
Madagascar  1977-80  6.9
Kenya  1972-79  5.5
Yemen  Arab  Republic  1977-80  5,3
Bolivia  1976-81  4.9b
Philippines  1977-79  3. 7b
India  1976-80  3.3
,trkey  1976-80  2.3
Argentina  1976-81  0.1
Industrial  countries
Sweden  1976-80  5.2
Australia  1976-80  4.5
Denmark  1976-79  3.6b
Norway  1976-80  3.3
Belgium  1976-80  2.7
Finland  1976-80  2.6
Netherlands  1970-80  2.3
France  1976-81  2. 0b
Germany,  Fed.  Rep.  of  1977-80  1.5
United  States  1976-81  1.4
Japan  1976-80  1.1
Austria  1976-80  0.2
Switzerland  1976-80  o.1b
United  Kingdom  1976-80  -0.01
Canada  1976-80  -0.8
a.  The  definition  of  public  employment  varies  across  countries  though  for
most  it  includes  only  the  central  and  local  government  employees.  See
Annex  to  Ozgediz  (1983)  for  sources  and  definitions.
b.  Includes  the  growth  of  employment  in  public  enterprises.
32Table  6:  Growth in  Central  Government Employment
Growth  in
Employment
Country  Years  (%/Annum)
Ghana  1975-82  15.0
Haiti  1979-82  10.0
Costa  Rica  1973-79  9.8
Nigeria  1977-83  8.6
Malawi  1977-83  7.9
Ethiopia  1974-81  6.5
Thailand  1979-84  6.2
Bolivia  1975-85  5.6
Senegal  1976-80  5.4
Malaysia  1975-85  4.7
Peru  1970-78  4.3
Sudan  1975-83  2.6
SinaP,_e  1975-R4  1.8
Sri  Lanka  1975-85  1.7
Zambia  1975-80  0.7
Guyana  1981-85  -1.2
Source:  Various  World  Bank  Reports.
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